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長期展望

收益優勢

疫後的通脹衝擊和加息週期已推動債券孳息出現世代級的向上重置,隨著通脹回落和其他市場風險升溫,固定收益在未來多年的前景別具吸引力。

環球經濟繼續從疫情的餘震中復甦,包括貿易錯位、大規模的貨幣及財政干預措施、通脹持續飆升,以及金融市場急劇波動。在2024年的品浩長期展望論壇上,我們探討了這些擾亂因素的餘波如何帶來意想不到的正面發展,同時也造成長期風險。

正面發展方面,在大部份已發展市場經濟體,通脹放緩的速度都快過預期。此外,宏觀經濟和通脹風險現已較一年前我們上次舉行長期展望論壇時更加平衡。各國央行亦準備轉向減息,但落實時間表可能不同。

然而,我們察覺到投資者雖已從下列三大領域獲得好處,卻可能忽略了或會在未來五年長期角度出現的風險:

  • 大規模財政刺激帶動美國近期錄得強勁增長,但這與眾不同的例外有其代價:美國的債務處於不可持續之勢,而政府最終需要解決這個問題。與此同時,金融市場可能越來越有需要在缺乏政府支持的預期下運作。
  • 人工智能有望重整勞動市場及提升生產力,但可能需要數年時間才會對經濟構成明顯影響。大規模資本投資伴隨股市快速上漲,令人聯想到過往的科網股熱潮。
  • 部份市場的資產估值為投資者提供的緩衝並不多,當中包括估值偏高的股票,以及流動性偏低且較易受浮動利率影響的低評級企業直接貸款市場。

對投資者來說,2020年代初的通脹衝擊及政策利率急升已推動債券孳息出現世代級的向上重置,現水平包含了顯著的通脹調整緩衝。初始孳息與五年遠期回報的相關性甚高,隨著通脹回落,這種相關性令固定收益回報的長期前景顯得吸引,特別是相對其他資產的經風險調整回報而言。環球債券市場的投資機會亦異常吸引和多元化,而主動選擇國家及證券是關鍵所在。

在這長期背景下,我們認為應該重新審視(甚至扭轉)傳統的60%股票/40%債券資產配置模式。

隨著銀行業退出某些市場,我們亦看見資產抵押貸款展現吸引的機會,尤其是受惠於美國強勁消費市道的消費者相關領域。我們預期銀行業去中介化及資本需求將為商業房地產債務創造機遇。

我們在長期展望論壇探討了美國和中國正如何帶領全球轉向多極世界秩序,並可能因而改變市場及政策動態。各國在過去數十年享有的和平紅利正逐漸變成衝突開支,未來可能形成一股顛覆力量。

長期主題:風險更平衡,但需警惕黃金時代

我們曾在2023年長期展望《餘震下的經濟》指出,2020年代初出現的擾亂因素可能會形成持久的新現實。我們看見宏觀經濟波幅加劇及增長呆滯的環境。我們也預期全球央行會竭盡所能令通脹回落至「略高於2%」的水平。

現在看來,這些論點大致仍然成立,但我們認為未來五年的展望必須納入及評估2023年5月論壇以來的重大事態發展:

  • 中東爆發戰事,而歐洲的俄烏戰爭已進入第三年。
  • 大部份已發展市場經濟體的通脹迅速放緩至「略高於2%」,而且暫時未見構成太大傷害。
  • 美國與其他已發展市場經濟體的通脹及增長走勢顯著分化。
  • 美國失業率接近歷史低位,而財政赤字卻出乎意料增加一倍。
  • 市場憂慮美國財政無以為繼的情況將在未來數年惡化,引發去年10月的「國庫券恐慌」。
  • 鑑於資金及流動性監管收緊,銀行業持續收緊放貸

我們的長期觀點亦建基於最新的週期展望《市場趨向各異,投資多元分散》。當時我們預期各國央行將分道揚鑣,採取不同的減息路徑,美國會保持相對強勁,而多個大型已發展市場經濟體的增長會放緩。美國金融市場已因此出現「重新增加風險」的主題,投資者亦關注這些趨勢僅屬短期現象抑或會長期持續。

央行保持靈活性…...

環球經濟曾在疫後出現急劇的週期性調整,現已漸漸發展出較持久的長期趨勢,並帶來重要的影響。從長期角度看來,雖然我們仍然預期環球經濟增長停滯及商業週期更趨波動,但這項展望所面對的風險似乎已較一年前更平衡。

當中部份是因為許多先進國家的通脹已迅速回落至「略高於2%」的水平。當局迅速緊縮政策,已令急升的通脹受控,而中期通脹預測並無上升。

另一方面,環球央行有默契地採取「機會型通脹放緩」策略,以引導通脹繼續邁向目標水平,亦是風險更趨平衡的原因。這種策略能夠為政策官員提供空間,可在通脹放緩時減息,從而支持經濟增長。

去年,我們曾關注緊縮貨幣狀況將引發金融不穩,但這情況未有出現。全球銀行業及非銀行業金融市場的系統性風險似乎受到控制。

儘管如此,監管趨勢明顯傾向於收緊對銀行資本和流動性的規定。如果銀行無法在若干市場提供資產負債表容量,許多貸款活動就可能會被推往私人資本市場。

我們認為,隨之而來會有越來越多的機會,讓投資者可以高級貸款人的身份搶佔過去被地區銀行盤踞的領域,例如消費貸款、按揭貸款及設備融資。商業房地產亦可為靈活資本提供機會,因為銀行收緊放貸會加劇房地產價格下跌帶來的挑戰,而未來數年將有超過2萬億美元的貸款到期

...…財政空間卻受到局限

雖然貨幣政策環境有所改善,但財政前景未有好轉。今年的長期展望論壇聚焦於環球財政發展,特別是美國聯邦債務的走勢。

究竟美國經濟展現的週期性強勢能否持久,抑或只是受疫情期間的政府支持措施和債務佔國內生產總值比率上升所帶動,現時仍有待觀察。如果美國最終面臨財政清算,政府可能會透過福利開支改革及加稅來整頓債務。無論從當前政治環境來看這是多麼不可能發生,但即使是不可觸碰的事,亦可能有需要改變的時候。

隨著投資者繼續要求長期債券提供更多補償,先進經濟體的主權債務佔國內生產總值龐大比重的情況(見圖 1),可能會令孳息曲線長期走峭。有證據顯示市場甚至早在央行開始減息前已反映上述調整,例如遠期通脹指數孳息或國庫券期限溢價預測(有關詳情請參閱我們最近的專題文章 《Will the True Treasury Term Premium Please Stand Up?》)。

Figure 1: Fiscal space likely to be limited
圖 1 顯示1903年至2023年間,美國和其他已開發經濟體公共債務占GDP百分比的折線圖。2021年,受疫情和全球金融危機影響,美國這個數字創下133.5%的新高,超過了二戰後1946年創下的高點。已開發經濟體的水準略低,但也有所上升。在2021 年達到122.9%,然後略有下降。資料來源:國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)、Carmen Reinhart、Kenneth Rogoff、PIMCO;截至2023年12月的年度資料。
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff, PIMCO; annual data through December 2023. “Advanced economies” refers to G-20 advanced economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, U.K., and U.S.) through 2015 and all IMF-defined advanced economies through 2023.

Authorities will almost surely face more constraints when looking to discretionary fiscal policy to limit the damage from future business cycle downturns. Our baseline is not a sudden financial crisis, but recurring episodes of market volatility when focus shifts to fiscal issues.

Despite these fiscal pressures, we believe that the U.S. dollar will remain the dominant global currency, in no small part due to the lack of a viable challenger. A U.S debt reckoning could eventually come about, but it’s not likely imminent given U.S. advantages in immigration, productivity, and innovation; U.S. Treasuries being a global reserve asset; and the general dynamism of the U.S. economy. An elevated demand for U.S. Treasury securities as a “safe haven,” liquid store of value has, to date, limited the bond market’s concerns about fiscal sustainability. That suggests the timeline for fiscal reforms may be super-secular.

The U.S. may still be the “cleanest dirty shirt” compared with other economies. China’s outlook is challenged by property sector recession, an aging population, and less-open export markets. In Europe, fragmented politics will make it difficult to build a comprehensive growth strategy in the face of regional conflict, energy insecurity, and more direct competition from China on higher-value manufactured goods.

Moving to a multipolar world

The geopolitical landscape is increasingly defined by tensions between a dominant superpower (the U.S.) and its rising rival (China). Both China and Russia have clear long-term visions that are at odds with Western ideals. The peace dividend realized over the past three decades is becoming a conflict outlay.

This underscores a shift toward a multipolar world order, where cooperation seems limited and new middle powers may emerge. The shift will likely also lead to changing correlations across markets and increased divergence in potential growth and policy responses. Business cycles will likely also be less synchronized. We expect the underlying forces will lead to greater macroeconomic and financial market volatility than pre-pandemic.

Risks to financial stability have also increased and could become problematic should these conflicts begin to materially alter cross-border financial flows or create conditions for capital impairments. We believe the risk premium for credit investment in China is too low to be attractive given potential risks.

We expect China’s growth to continue slowing without stalling. Notably, China is re-globalizing. Its new growth model, focused on production and infrastructure to counterbalance a property sector collapse, is driving a rise in manufacturing exports. This pivot requires reevaluating China’s role in the global economy, especially its impact on commodity markets and inflation, as well as its integration into the global financial order.

Major emerging markets (EM) have displayed remarkable resilience this cycle. The typical combination of factors that often trigger EM crises – capital flight, tighter financial conditions, and a collapse in commodity prices – is not currently evident, nor does it appear likely to emerge over the secular horizon. Debt levels in EM countries are increasing but so far remain at sustainable levels compared with DM.

Roughly 60% of the world by GDP weight will be voting in a major election this year. With early signs of populist parties gaining support – particularly in Europe – global elections have scope to change both economic and geopolitical policy priorities. We see risks that elections increase trends toward fragmentation, multipolarity, and protectionist measures, favoring friend-shoring investments. Countries such as India, Indonesia, and Mexico are positioned to benefit.

Turning to the U.S. presidential election, we believe trade, tax policy, immigration, regulation, and environmental policy have the greatest scope for disruption. U.S. fiscal deficits are likely to remain near historic highs regardless of the election outcome. Both political parties are also focused on remaining tough on China.

AI effects coming into focus

Generative AI has the potential to transform labor markets and democratize access to decision-making tasks, enabling more of the workforce to make informed decisions.

But many organizations will face challenges as they seek to leverage AI effectively. Dramatically enhanced productivity and efficiency may not be evident in the macro data over the next five years. This is because maximizing the payoff from AI at the macro level will require not only adoption of the technology itself, but also the reconfiguration of work streams and the rethinking of production processes at the micro level of individual organizations.

Similar to the experience with other new technologies over the past few decades, there may not be much of an incremental impact on productivity from modest enhancements of existing work practices. But there is a chance of breakthrough changes that could have a larger impact on productivity growth in certain specific areas, such as healthcare and science.

While our base case is that the full impact of new AI large language models manifests gradually over the secular horizon, it’s possible that disruptions may occur more quickly. The capital spending boom in computing, data centers, and green energy technology increases availability of these resources for applications beyond AI, while AI investment makes AI-supported breakthroughs in other fields increasingly plausible. Downside surprises are possible as well, especially if misuse of AI models for surveillance, manipulation, or security threats results in innovation-stifling restrictions.

For now, capital spending can lead to a shorter-term sugar high. Ultimately, efficiency gains will be needed to generate longer-term sustainable growth.

The demand for chips, data centers, and the generation capacity that will power them is expected to be explosive, and these trends will have immediate sectoral consequences.

Neutral policy rates to remain low

Today’s elevated policy rates are the result of cyclical forces, namely an inflationary spike. Once inflation stabilizes near central bank targets, we expect neutral monetary policy rates in advanced economies will likely settle at levels below those that prevailed before the global financial crisis.

We believe the neutral nominal policy rate in the U.S. over our secular horizon will likely remain in the range of 2%–3% (implying a long-run neutral real rate of 0%–1%). By contrast, current pricing indicates markets expect the neutral rate may not fall far below 4%. That can present further opportunities for bond investors, as yields today already embed cushion in the form of positive real rates and term premium.

We expect central bank balance sheets, which are currently contracting under quantitative tightening (QT) programs, will remain substantially larger than before the era of quantitative easing (QE). DM central banks will likely continue to use asset purchase programs to ensure the smooth functioning of sovereign debt and repurchase markets, and to act as lenders of last resort. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s 2023 Bank Term Funding Program and the Bank of England’s 2022 operation to support the U.K. gilt market.

However, we think it is less likely that central banks deploy open-ended QE asset purchase programs in response to future economic downturns. The financial strain of maintaining large securities portfolios, where the costs of funding exceed the returns from these assets, has become increasingly apparent.

Monetary and fiscal puts – or expectations of government relief in the event of downturns – are further out of the money today. That constrains the government’s ability to stimulate flagging economies and provide support to dampen shocks. We expect additional volatility as markets trade more on fundamentals and less on the expectation that governments will come to the rescue.

Investment implications: Fixed income resurgence

Our 2024 Secular Outlook favors a renewed focus on public fixed income markets, which we believe are poised to generate competitive returns and lower risk compared with other asset classes. Today’s yields and a stabilizing inflation outlook are enabling bonds to reassert their fundamental advantages in portfolios: providing potential for attractive income, downside resilience, and stability through reduced correlation with equities.

Many sophisticated asset allocators have moved well beyond the traditional 60% stocks / 40% bonds paradigm. Even so, it remains an oft-cited rule of thumb that frames many investment conversations. We believe we are entering an era that warrants a rethinking and a reversal of that concept.

The post-pandemic inflation shock and subsequent central bank rate-hiking cycle reset bond yields sharply higher. Historically, starting yields are highly predictive of bond returns over a multiyear horizon (see Figure 2). The yields on the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate and Global Aggregate (hedged to U.S. dollar) Indexes, two common benchmarks for high quality bonds, are about 5.31% and 5.41%, respectively, as of 30 April 2024.

Figure 2: Starting yields in bond markets historically correlated with 5-year forward returns
圖2以折線圖顯示1976年1月至2024年4月期間彭博美國綜合債券指數的孳息及隨後5年回報。在該段時間範圍內,初始孳息與5年遠期回報的相關性甚高(94%)。2010年起的平均孳息為2.6%,但孳息自2021年起持續上升,截至2024年4月30日為5.31%。資料來源:彭博、品浩。
Source: Bloomberg, PIMCO as of 30 April 2024. Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future performance. Chart is provided for illustrative purposes only and is not indicative of the past or future performance of any PIMCO product. Yield and return are for the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. It is not possible to invest directly in an unmanaged index.

Using that as a baseline, active investment managers can seek to enhance the yields investors earn. By identifying attractive opportunities in high quality areas – such as agency mortgage-backed securities – active managers can currently construct portfolios yielding about 6%–7% without taking on significant interest rate, credit, or illiquidity risk.

As a result, a diversified bond allocation offers the potential for long-term equity-like returns with a more favorable risk-adjusted profile, especially given what may be stretched valuations in stock markets (see Figure 3). Markets don’t appear to price significant recession risk, meaning bonds may be an inexpensive means to hedge that risk.

Figure 3: Equities screen expensive on an absolute basis and relative to U.S. Treasuries
圖3包括一個列表和一幅折線圖。該折線圖反映1953年5月至2024年4月的股票風險溢價(定義為股息率減去實質債券孳息,股票以標準普爾500指數為代表)。在此期間,股票風險溢價曾於1982年升至9.7%的高位,並於1999年跌至-2.0%的低位,然後在2009年再次升至5.7%,疫情之後則跌至0.59%(截至2024年4月30日)。列表顯示截至2024年4月30日的經週期調整市盈率(CAPE)為33.38,實質股息率(定義為1/CAPE)為3.00%,30年實質債券孳息為2.41。資料來源:彭博、Robert Shiller網上數據、Global Financial Data、品浩。
Source: Bloomberg, Robert Shiller online data, Global Financial Data, PIMCO as of 30 April 2024. All value metrics are relative to the S&P 500 Index. CAPE is the cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio. Real equity yield ratio refers to the average real earnings over the past 10 years divided by the last price. 30-year real bond yield corresponds to the yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), backfilled with the nominal yield on 30-year U.S. Treasuries minus expected inflation. To compute inflation expectations, we estimate trend inflation according to Cieslak and Povala (2015) calibration and forecast inflation 30 years ahead.

Bonds today also embed a term premium that offers a cushion. We expect yield curves to steepen as policy rates decline and the term premium builds (for more, read our February PIMCO Perspectives, “Back to the Future: Term Premium Poised to Rise Again, With Widespread Asset-Price Implications”), and we have a curve steepener as a structural trade.

In the wake of its longest-ever inversion, the U.S. yield curve remains relatively flat. That means investors do not need to take a lot of interest rate risk. We currently find value at the 5-year part of the yield curve and are wary of potential underperformance of the long end due to fiscal concerns. Active fixed income is positioned to perform well if there are no recessions over our secular horizon and to perform even better if there are, with the potential for price appreciation if yields decline, which makes bonds attractive compared with cash, in our view.

Global bond markets offer particularly attractive and diverse opportunities that investors might be overlooking as a way to enhance yield without significantly increasing risk. Global yields – across DM and EM – have returned to attractive levels. Many economies outside of the U.S. face more fragility yet enjoy better starting fiscal conditions, both supportive of bonds.

We expect business cycles will be less synchronized, which will lead to lower correlations across financial markets. The differentiation in central bank policies and market conditions across regions presents unique opportunities for active, global investment platforms to capitalize on these discrepancies and potentially further enhance returns through country and security selection. Industrial subsidies and trade policies promoting onshoring, friend-shoring, and the energy transition will likely create both sectoral and national winners and losers, presenting further opportunities for active investors.

Given potential volatility around inflation, U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), commodities, and real assets offer inflation-hedging properties and higher real rates than pre-pandemic levels.

Prioritize credit selection and liquidity

While credit spreads appear broadly fair overall, credit and sector selection are poised to become more important over our secular horizon. Growth in both public and private credit markets should give active investors with flexible capital more opportunities during periods of volatility.

Many stronger, more resilient companies generate significant cash and don’t rely heavily on financing. Many weaker companies tend to need greater ongoing access to credit. The more productivity-enhancing AI technologies are, the more disruptive they are likely to be across companies and industries, creating more winners and losers. In the past, the advent of new technologies has often been followed by boom-bust cycles, creating volatility but also presenting bottom-up active investment opportunities.

We expect increased regulation for banks, which should lead to more disintermediation and more money flowing through private markets. Our focus remains on liquidity gaps arising from banks being pressured to manage capital and meet regulatory requirements. For example, this bank retrenchment will likely create opportunities for flexible capital in CRE debt, as we expect large-scale capital needs for asset owners facing a wall of loan maturities.

Asset-based lending is a prime example of what we see as an attractive and less crowded investment opportunity. Middle-market corporate lending appears to be in favor within private markets, but we believe areas such as consumer lending offer outstanding long-term fundamentals and value as U.S. household leverage has declined (see Figure 4) and housing markets remain well-supported.

圖4:家庭債務減少,私人企業貸款增加

圖4包括兩幅折線圖,顯示1967年12月至2023年12月的數據。第一幅圖顯示兩類債務佔美國國內生產總值的百分比,分別是美國家庭債務,以及美國企業(非金融業)債務。在此期間,家庭負債比率於2008年及2009年升至97%的高位,然後在2019年回落至74%,疫情期間曾於2020年短暫急升至82%,後來再跌至71%。企業負債比率在疫情期間曾升至92%的高位,其後回落至76%。第二幅圖顯示另外兩種債務數據佔美國國內生產總值的百分比,分別是美國私人信貸和銀行貸款(以聯邦儲備局資金流數據中的其他貸款和墊款類別作代表),以及非金融企業債務。在相同時間範圍內,私人信貸曾於2022年升至10%的高位,現為9%。非金融企業債務曾在2020年升至38%的高位,現為30%。兩幅圖的陰影部份代表美國經濟衰退時期。資料來源:聯邦儲備局資金流數據、Haver Analytics及品浩的計算。
資料來源:聯邦儲備局資金流數據、Haver Analytics及品浩的計算,截至2023年12月31日。註:非金融企業業務其他貸款及墊款類別用作代表私人信貸和銀行貸款等資產。

We would contrast that with the amount of capital now concentrated in corporate lending. We are very concerned about the rapid growth within private, floating-rate markets that may not have been tested through prior default cycles. These conditions increase the risk of excesses building in areas such as technology and direct lending to companies with high leverage and lower credit ratings. Challenges could emerge during our secular time frame.

Given the high potential for returns in the more liquid segments of the bond market, investors should have a high hurdle – in the form of attractive return potential and strong lender covenants – for giving up liquidity. At today’s yield levels, the risk-adjusted return potential of broadening exposure to public fixed income markets – such as increasing allocations to high quality DM and EM bonds – also compares favorably with the trade-offs involved in extending into less liquid areas of credit markets.


1 According to Newmark Research calculations, as of 12 February 2024. 


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2024 Secular Forum guest speakers

Tobias Adrian

Financial Counsellor and Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, International Monetary Fund

Anima Anandkumar

Bren Professor of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Caltech

David Autor

Ford Professor of Economics, MIT

Jason Furman

Aetna Professor of the Practice of Economic Policy jointly at Harvard Kennedy School and the Department of Economics, Harvard University

Kevin Hassett

Brent R. Nicklas Distinguished Fellow in Economics, Hoover Institution; former Chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers

John H. Cochrane

Rose-Marie and Jack Anderson Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution

Carmen Reinhart

Minos A. Zombanakis Professor of the International Financial System, Harvard Kennedy School

Brad Setser

Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

Wendy R. Sherman

Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State

PIMCO’s Global Advisory Board

World-renowned experts on economic and political issues

About our forums

PIMCO is a global leader in active fixed income with deep expertise across public and private markets. Our investment process is anchored by our Secular and Cyclical Economic Forums. Four times a year, our investment professionals from around the world gather to discuss and debate the state of the global markets and economy and identify the trends that we believe will have important investment implications. In these wide-reaching discussions, we apply behavioral science practices in an effort to maximize the interchange of ideas, challenge our assumptions, counter cognitive biases, and generate inclusive insights.

At the Secular Forum, held annually, we focus on the outlook for the next five years, allowing us to position portfolios to benefit from structural changes and trends in the global economy. Because we believe diverse ideas produce better investment results, we invite distinguished guest speakers – Nobel laureate economists, policymakers, investors, and historians – who bring valuable, multidimensional perspectives to our discussions. We also welcome the active participation of the PIMCO Global Advisory Board, a team of world-renowned experts on economic and political issues.

At the Cyclical Forum, held three times a year, we focus on the outlook for the next six to 12 months, analyzing business cycle dynamics across major developed and emerging market economies with an eye toward identifying potential changes in monetary and fiscal policies, market risk premiums, and relative valuations that drive portfolio positioning.

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